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In this paper we examine the wealth effect of stock repurchase announcements using a sample of 
11,862 repurchase programs announced during 1994-2007.  The results of several recent industry 
surveys indicate that managerial motivations for repurchasing shares may have changed in recent 
years.  To better understand the reasons for repurchasing shares we classify our sample in 
various ways - by year, by the method used for repurchasing shares, by the stated purpose of the 
program, by the method of financing, and by program size.  We find that the median size of 
firms repurchasing shares has increased dramatically recently, and concomitantly, the 
announcement returns have declined.  Signaling undervaluation of share prices appears to 
become less important than previously assumed.  While smaller firms signal undervaluation 









The number of firms announcing stock repurchase programs has increased steadily since 
the mid-1980s.  According to a press release by the Standard and Poor‟s Corporation (S&P), the 
total dollar amount that was spent annually on stock repurchases by S&P 500 firms was 
approximately equal to total dividend payments during the late 1990s and the early 2000s ($130-
160 billion annually).
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  However, stock repurchase activity has intensified since then. The total 
amount spent on repurchases was $197 billion in 2004, $349 billion in 2005, $432 billion in 
2006, and $590 billion in 2007.  By comparison, these firms paid $245 billion of dividends in 
2007, out of reported total earnings of $587 billion.  The dramatic increase in recent stock 
repurchase activity clearly demonstrates the growing importance of repurchase programs in the 
implementation of corporate strategies.  
There is ample evidence in the literature that stock repurchases generate significantly 
positive announcement-period abnormal returns.  Fixed-price or Dutch-auction tender offers 
seem to generate much larger positive returns than open market repurchases.  Several studies 
report average abnormal announcement-period returns of 3 - 5% for open market repurchases 
(see Dann, 1981; Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
Vermaelen, 1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Chan, Ikenberry, and Lee, 2004), and 8 - 15% 
for fixed-price or Dutch-auction tender offers (Comment and Jarrell, 1991; Louis and White, 
2007).  The stock markets react positively to repurchase announcements. 
The academic literature has explored a number of alternative explanations of stock 
repurchases.  One popular hypothesis is that repurchases signal managerial beliefs about share-
price undervaluation (Vermaelen, 1981; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990; Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; D‟Mello and 
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Schroff, 2000; Chan, Ikenberry and Lee, 2004; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2005).  Open-market stock 
repurchase is also thought to be a commonly used method of distributing excess cash flows to the 
shareholders (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Nohel and Tarhan, 1998; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon 
and Michaely, 2004; Skinner, 2008).  Several other theories have also been proposed to explain 
stock repurchases.  Companies may repurchase shares to improve their leverage ratios 
(Vermaelen, 1981; Bagwell and Shoven; 1988; Opler and Titman, 1996), fend off unwanted 
takeover attempts (Bagwell, 1991), or to counter the dilution effects of employee stock option 
plans (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002).   
Of these various hypotheses the signaling (undervaluation) hypothesis and the free cash 
flow hypothesis have received the most attention in the academic literature.  However, the results 
of a few recently conducted industry surveys (and of a recent academic study) cast doubts about 
the validity of the signaling (undervaluation) hypothesis (see Baker, Powell, and Veit, 2003; 
Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005; Dittmar and Dittmar, 2008).  These studies suggest 
that firms repurchase shares primarily to distribute free cash flows to shareholders, and not 
necessarily to signal share-price undervaluation.  The lack of support for the signaling hypothesis 
in this recent literature is remarkable, given its recognition in the earlier academic literature.  In 
this paper, we reexamine the evidence using stock repurchase data from 1994 to 2007.  We 
examine whether the announcement-period wealth effect is related to the various attributes of the 
program, such as the method used for repurchasing shares, the stated purpose of the program, the 
method of financing, and the program size.   
Our study differs from previous studies in several important ways.  Previous studies 
generally use smaller sample sizes.  We include all repurchase program announcements that are 
listed in the SDC Platinum database between 1994 and 2007. The SDC Platinum database has 
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the most detailed and accurate information on stock repurchases announcements.  Also, earlier 
studies examine either open market repurchases or Dutch-auction/fixed-price tender offers.  We 
examine all reported types of share repurchases (including privately negotiated stock 
repurchases).  We also examine whether the wealth effect depends upon the different 
characteristics of the announced programs.  The SDC Platinum database reports different 
features of repurchase programs, such as the method of repurchase, the stated purpose of the 
program, sources of funding, the initial size of program, completion percentages, etc.  We expect 
to gain a better understanding about the true motivations behind the decision to repurchase by 
linking the wealth effect to these attributes of the programs.   
The main results of our paper can be summarized as follows.  We find that the median 
size of firms announcing repurchases has increased dramatically in recent years (since 2003).  
The median market value of repurchasing firms has increased from about $200-$300 million in 
the early two-thirds of our sample period to between $400 and $1,200 million in the latter one-
third of our sample.  The total dollar amount of repurchases has also increased rather 
dramatically in the more recent time period.  Since bigger firms generally have less information 
asymmetries than smaller firms, share-price undervaluation for these firms should be less 
prevalent than for smaller firms.  We find some evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis in 
the early part of our sample period (1994-2002).  However, data from the more recent time 
period do not support the signaling hypothesis.  The data show that firms that list „undervalued 
shares‟ as the reason for repurchasing shares are smaller than firms listing other reasons.  
Moreover, the number of firms listing „undervalued shares‟ as the rationale for repurchasing 
shares has declined in recent times.  The wealth effect of repurchase announcements has also 
declined drastically in the recent time period.  The average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
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for the three-day announcement event window (0, +2) has declined from over 3% before 2003, to 
under 2% since 2003. 
We also find that firms announcing open-market stock repurchases experience 
significantly large pre-announcement period negative abnormal returns (about 6% on average in 
the 30-days prior to the announcement).  The pre-announcement returns for the other types of 
repurchases (tender offers, negotiated offers, etc.) are slightly positive.  However, the three-day 
announcement period positive share-price bounce is much larger for Dutch-auctions and for 
fixed-price tender offers than for open market repurchases.  Rau and Vermaelen (2002) argue 
that open market repurchase announcements simply authorize managers to purchase shares in the 
future at their discretion.  Therefore, these should not be viewed as firm commitments to actually 
repurchase the shares.  Our evidence is consistent with the idea that tender offers are used to 
convey managerial optimism about future prospects of the firm.  Overall, our results support the 
findings of recent surveys that the primary motivation for repurchasing shares may have changed 
over time from signaling undervaluation to other possible reasons.   
Our paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the data and our sample.  Section 
3 presents the main empirical results of the paper.  Summary and concluding remarks are in 
Section 4.  
 
2. Data 
The sample is drawn from the SDC Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database.  The 
database contains information on stock repurchases since the 1980s.  We choose 1994 as the 
starting year of our sample because the data coverage seems to be more comprehensive since 
1994.  The data includes repurchase programs announced by firms that are listed on the NYSE, 
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AMEX, or the NASDAQ.  The initial authorization date (IAD) of a program is the date that the 
company‟s board of directors first authorizes the repurchase program.  A repurchase program 
may have multiple board authorizations.  These subsequent announcements authorize changes in 
the previously announced programs, such as an expansion of an existing program.  We exclude 
these subsequent authorizations from our sample.   Repurchase programs that are announced 
within a month of a previously announced program are also excluded from the sample. 
To remain in our sample, repurchasing firms must have data available on the CRSP and 
the Compustat tapes during the pre-event estimation period and the event period.  Our final 
sample consists of 11,862 repurchase programs that were announced between 1994 and 2007.  
These 11,862 repurchase programs were announced by 5,200 different firms.  
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics.  The number of program announcements 
peaked in 1998 with 1,396 cases, which declined gradually to 826 cases in 2007.  The table also 
reports sample median values for the percentage of outstanding shares authorized for repurchase 
at the initial authorization date (PSIAD), the total dollar value authorized at the initial 
authorization date (VIAD), the total dollar value authorized from the beginning date to the 
ending date of a repurchase program (TVA), the total number of shares authorized from the 
beginning date to the ending date of a repurchase program (TSA), the total dollar amount spent 
on completing the repurchase program (TVR), and the market value of the repurchasing firm‟s 
equity at the initial authorization date (MVE).  TVA and VIAD may not be equal because 
repurchasing firms often authorize additional share repurchases after the initial authorization.  
The reported TVA and TSA numbers include repurchases that were authorized after the initial 
authorization.   
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The average size of the programs did not change much from year to year until about 2002.  
Value authorized at the initial authorization data (VIAD) stayed between $10 million and $17 
million, total value authorized (TVA) was about $5 million more than VIAD, and the total 
number of shares authorized (TSA) was between 1 and 1.5 million shares.  The program size 
increased rapidly after 2002.  Median TVA jumped to $30 million in 2003 and then increased to 
$66.8 million in 2007.  TSA was 1.83 million shares in 2003 and 2.5 million shares in 2007.  The 
actual cost of completing a repurchase program (TVR) followed the same pattern, increasing 
from $13.7 million in 2002 to $50.6 million in 2007.  The median market capitalization of the 
repurchasing firms (MVE) was between $200 and $300 million until 2002.  MVE jumped to 
$407 million in 2003 and to $1,086 million in 2007.   
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Although the size of the programs increased dramatically after 2002, the relative size of 
the programs (relative to the company‟s market capitalization or total shares outstanding) stayed 
within a narrow range.  The median percentage of shares authorized at the initial authorization 
date (PSIAD) varied between 5% and 6% between 1994 and 2007.   
We next classify the sample based on different features of the announced programs.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the different methods that are used to repurchase shares.  There are 
four basic methods that are used.  In an open market repurchase, the company buys back shares 
in the open market typically over a long period of time.  Management retains the right to decide 
whether, when, and how many shares are actually repurchased.  In a fixed-price tender offer, the 
company offers to buy a specified number of shares at a given price (which is typically set at a 
significant premium over the current market price) until a stipulated expiration date.  The offer 
may be made conditional upon receiving tenders for a minimum number of shares.  The 
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company generally reserves the right to withdraw the offer before the expiration date, to extend 
the offer if fewer than the desired number of shares are tendered, to buy more than the number 
specified, or to purchase the shares on a pro rata basis if the offer is oversubscribed.  If the 
number of shares tendered is fewer than the number that was originally indicated in the offer, 
management typically buys all the tendered shares.   
A Dutch-auction offer specifies the number of shares and a range of prices (instead of a 
single offering price) within which the shares will be purchased.  The tendering shareholders 
specify the number of shares that they wish to sell, and the minimum acceptable price within the 
range.  Auctions give repurchasing firms much greater flexibility in sizing and pricing the deal.  
Finally, negotiated or private repurchases entail buying a block of shares from a large 
shareholder through direct negotiations.  The negotiations can be initiated either by the 
repurchasing firm or by the shareholder.  A combination of these four different methods can also 
be employed in a repurchase program.
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Panel A of Table 2 shows that open market repurchase is the most commonly used 
method, accounting for 54.45% of our sample.  The next most commonly used method (37.19% 
of our sample) is a combination of open market and negotiated (or private) repurchase.  
Negotiated repurchases account for 4.30% of the sample.  The remainder of our sample is almost 
equally divided between Dutch-auction tender offers (2.19%) and fixed-price tender offers 
(1.88%).   
Panel A also reports the percentage of shares authorized at the initial authorization date 
(PSIAD), the total dollar value authorized at the initial authorization date (VIAD), the total dollar 
value authorized over the life of the program (TVA), and the median market value of equity 
(MVE) of the repurchasing firms.  MVE varies widely from method to method.  The median 
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MVE for the Dutch-auction group is large at $380 million, which is more than twice the median 
MVE for the fixed-price tender offers ($152 million).  
Total value authorized (TVA) is largest for the Dutch-auction group at $57 million, 
compared to only $21.5 million for the fixed-price tender offers.  The percentage of shares 
authorized at the initial authorization date (PSAIAD) is only 5% for the open market repurchases, 
whereas it is much larger at 13.63% for the Dutch-auctions, and 15% for the fixed-price tender 
offers.  The offering price is at an average premium of 7.6% for the Dutch-auction offers and 8.0% 
for the fixed-price tender offers over the announcement-day market price of the shares. 
 Panel B of Table 2 reports management‟s stated reasons for announcing the share 
repurchase programs.  Some firms state a specific purpose in their press release.  For example, 
when L-3 Communication announced its first-ever stock repurchase program on December 18, 
2006, the firm announced that “it is a new addition to that company's use of cash to enhance 
shareholder value.” 
3
  On June 16, 2006, Herley Industries offered the following rationale for 




Fewer than 30% of the firms in our sample disclose a specific purpose.  The 
announcements where no specific purposes are disclosed are coded as “General Corporate 
Purpose” announcements.  The SDC Platinum dataset reports eleven different rationales for 
stock repurchases, including “Enhance Shareholder Value,” “Undervalued” (shares), “Stock 
Option Plan,” “Employee Benefits Plans,” “Offset Dilution Effect,” “Acquisition Purpose,” 
“Prevent Takeover,”  etc.  Many programs list only one specific purpose.  However, some 
programs also list multiple purposes.  In the cases where multiple purposes are listed, we classify 
the programs according to the purpose that is listed first.  
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Of the 11,862 repurchase programs in our sample, 3,337 programs disclose at least one 
specific purpose.  Among these, “Enhance Shareholder Value” accounts for 1,646 cases, or 14.03% 
of the sample.  The SDC Platinum dataset does not provide detailed explanations regarding the 
meaning of each stated purpose.  As discussed previously, firms can “Enhance Shareholder 
Value” in various ways – by distributing excess cash to the shareholders, by changing the 
leverage ratios toward the optimal capital structure, by avoiding dividend taxation, by reducing 
agency costs, etc.   
Only 613 programs list “Undervalued” shares as the stated reason for repurchasing shares 
(5.23% of the sample).  As discussed earlier, the academic literature posits that managers 
repurchase shares primarily to signal private information about share-price undervaluation.  
However, only a small fraction of our sample lists “Undervalued” shares as the stated reason for 
repurchasing shares.  The other listed purposes include “Stock Option Plan” (4.30% of the 
sample), “Employee Benefits Plans” (2.86% of the sample), and “Offset Dilution Effect” (2.03% 
of sample).  A tiny fraction of the firms in our sample list other purposes.  We do not include 
these cases in Panel B.  The percentages listed in Panel B are generally consistent with the results 
that are reported in industry survey studies that list managerial rationale for stock repurchases 
(Wansley, Lane, and Sarkar, 1989; Tsetsekos, Kaufman, and Gitman, 1991; Baker, Powell, and 
Veit, 2003; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005).   
Panel B shows that firms listing “Undervalued” shares are much smaller than firms 
listing other purposes.  The median market value of equity for the “Undervalued” group is only 
$140 million, compared to the sample median of $370 million.  This result is consistent with the 
notion that share-price undervaluation is most common among small firms, since small firms are 
likely to have large information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.  Thus small firms 
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repurchase shares to signal undervalued prices of shares.  Almost all of the firms that announce 
fixed-price and Dutch-auction tender offers (and disclose a specific purpose) list “Enhance 
Shareholder Value” as the reason for repurchasing shares.  Firms announcing open market 
repurchases list various reasons – 55% list “Enhance Shareholder Value,” 24% list “undervalued” 
shares, and 12% specify “Employee Benefit Plans” as their reasons for repurchasing stocks.  We 
also find that the number of cases listing “Undervalued” shares as the rationale has decreased 
sharply since 2002.  The number has decreased from 50 programs in 2002 to only 20 in 2003, 7 
in 2004, and 5 in 2005.   
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
The academic literature has largely ignored the issue of financing methods used to 
repurchase shares.   In our sample of repurchase programs, 77% do not disclose the source of 
funding (Panel C, Table 2).  For the remaining 23% of our sample, 17 different funding sources 
are listed on the SDC Platinum database.   Some examples of listed funding sources are “Cash 
from Operation,” “Cash Reserves,” “Debt Securities,” “Borrowing,” “Revolving Line of Credit,” 
“Common Stock Offering,” etc.  Most repurchase programs are primarily funded from two or 
three different sources.  For example, a repurchase can be financed in part by borrowing, and in 
part by using the firm‟s cash reserves.  Based on our subjective assessment of each program, we 
classify these into four financing groups: cash-financed programs, debt-financed programs, 
programs funded by cash and debt, and stock-financed programs.  The associated statistics are 
reported in Panel C of Table 2.  15.78% of the programs are cash-financed, whereas 4.80% are 
financed by issuing new debt.  In a small percentage of the cases (0.29%), stock is issued to 
finance the programs.
5
  Among the cash-financed repurchases, more programs utilize “Cash 
Reserve” than “Cash from Operations.”  These results are somewhat consistent with previous 
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studies that report that repurchases are financed with temporary cash flows (Jagannathan and 
Stephens, 2003; Baker et al., 2003).  Incidentally, cash and debt are almost equally used to 
finance fixed-price and Dutch-auction tender offers, whereas cash is the main source of funding 
for open market repurchases.   
 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1. Announcement Returns 
We estimate market model parameters by regressing each firm‟s daily return on the 
CRSP value-weighted index return over 255 trading days, beginning on day -301 and ending 46 
trading days before the announcement date.  Daily abnormal returns from t = -10 to t = +10 are 
reported in Table 3.
6
  Table 3 also reports parametric (Patell test) and non-parametric test 
(Corrado Rank test) statistics (Z statistics and the associated p-values are reported) to assess 
significance of the abnormal returns.  The non-parametric test is well-specified, and is more 
powerful at detecting a false null hypothesis of zero abnormal return, when the assumption of 
normality is violated.  Therefore, we base our conclusions on the results of the non-parametric 
test.  
The results in Table 3 can be summarized as follows: 1) Daily abnormal returns are 
consistently negative until the day prior to the announcement date; 2) Significantly positive 
market reaction starts from the announcement day (t = 0) and continues for three days; 3) After 
the three-day announcement-period, the daily abnormal returns are small and statistically 
insignificant. 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Consistent with the economic explanations of the wealth effect of stock repurchases, the 
announcement of a repurchase program is received favorably by the market.  The announcement- 
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day abnormal return is 1.69% (rank Z-value = 12.04).  This is followed by a positive abnormal 
return of 0.85% (rank Z-value = 6.89) on day 1, and then by 0.18% (rank Z-value = 1.72) on day 
2.  The abnormal returns from day 3 are small and insignificantly different from zero.   
Previous studies have reported that repurchase programs typically follow a period of 
significant abnormal stock price declines, but that the share prices bounce back on the 
announcement date (Vermaelen, 1981; Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1990; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen, 1995; Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Jagannathan and Stephens, 2003; Peyer 
and Vermaelen, 2005).  This finding is consistent with the implications of the signaling or 
undervaluation theory, or is at least consistent with the argument that companies time their 
repurchases to coincide with temporary declines in their stock prices. 
Table 4 reports the average cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for various windows 
relative to the announcement date (day 0).  We examine CARs from day -180 to day +180 
relative to the announcement day at 30-day intervals.  The rank Z-values in Panel A show that 
significant stock price declines begin about 120 days prior to the announcement date.  The CAR 
over the window (-120, -1) is -11.84%.  The significantly negative abnormal returns begin much 
earlier than what Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) report.  Ikenberry, Lakonishok, 
and Vermaelen (1995) observe significantly negative abnormal returns starting from 20 days 
before the announcement date, and ending 3 days before the announcement.  Also, the negative 
30-day CARs become larger as we get closer to the announcement day.  The CAR over the 
windows (-120, 91), (-90, -61), (-60, -31), and (-30, -1) are -1.09, -1.60%, -3.29%, and -5.86%, 
respectively. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
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Upon closer examination of the data, we find that the pre-announcement CARs are 
negative only for the open market and the open market/negotiated repurchases.  We do not 
observe the same pattern of negative pre-announcement CARs in fixed-price and Dutch-auction 
tender offers.  It is possible that firms experiencing large declines in share prices in the pre-
announcement period choose open-market repurchase to signal undervaluation.  Open market 
repurchases allow firms greater flexibility and control (than tender offers) to time the market to 
capitalize on the underperformance of their stock. 
We also examine post-announcement abnormal returns.  Panel B of Table 4 shows 
negative but insignificant CARs over different windows after the announcement.  Although we 
only examine CARs for up to six months after the announcement, our results contradict some of 
the findings that are reported in the literature.  Several studies report that repurchase 
announcements are followed by long-run return drifts in the U.S., Canada and Britain, as the 
markets tend to under-react to the information contained in the announcements (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1995 and 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Chan, Ikenberry and 
Lee, 2004; Oswald and Young, 2004).  Most of the post-announcement CARs reported in Panel 
B of Table 4 are negative, but they are statistically insignificant based on the rank Z statistics.   
We next examine the wealth effect of repurchase announcements for each year of our 
sample.  Table 5 reports CARs for the announcement period (0, +2) for the total sample and two 
subsamples.  One subsample is the open market repurchase group that includes pure open market 
repurchases as well as combinations of open market and negotiated (or private) repurchase.  
Another subsample is the tender offer repurchase group that includes both Dutch-auction tender 
offers and fixed-price tender offers.   
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 Across all three groups, we find a distinctive change in the magnitude of announcement 
returns after 2002.  For the total sample and open market repurchase subsample, the three-day 
CAR declined from over 3% before 2003 to below 2% thereafter.  For the tender offers, the 
return declined from the 6 – 13% range before 2003 to below 4% after that.  Our multivariate 
analysis, which is reported in Table 9, confirms the weakened wealth effect even after other deal 
characteristics such as size, stated purposes, and financing methods are controlled.  
Interestingly, this announcement wealth effect change occurs around the same time 
(around 2003) that bigger firms started repurchasing shares.  As we reported in Table 1 earlier, 
the median size of firms announcing repurchases (and the median size of the announced 
programs) increased rather dramatically around 2003.  The total value authorized (TVA) 
increased from $11 - $23 million before 2002, to $30 - $78 million after 2002.  Since bigger 
firms are more widely followed by analysts and investors, information asymmetry is likely to be 
less severe for such firms.  Thus shares of bigger firms are more efficiently priced than shares of 
smaller firms.  We also reported earlier (in Table 2) that firms stating “undervalued” shares as 
the reason for repurchasing shares tend to be much smaller on average than firms specifying 
other reasons.   
In addition, Skinner (2008) reported that repurchases are increasingly linked to earnings 
in a manner that suggests they are replacing regular dividends.  Also, large, mature, and 
profitable firms that continue to pay dividends but now also make regular repurchases dominates 
the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and payouts.  The totality of the evidence is consistent 
with the notion that as bigger firms started repurchasing shares (around 2003), repurchases 
become the dominant form of payout and the relative importance of the signaling effect (and thus 
the magnitude of the wealth effect) diminished significantly.
7
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The mean market reaction is decreasing slightly over time. This result is consistent with the 
notion that because open market programs are relatively low cost to establish and are becoming 
more common, the market may be growingly accustomed to recurring repurchase programs, thus 
reducing their informative impact over time. 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
3.2. Different Types of Repurchase Programs 
We next classify the sample by the announced method of repurchase, and examine 
abnormal returns for each method.  It is possible to argue that fixed-price and Dutch-auction 
tender offers convey the strongest credible signals of managerial conviction about future 
prospects of the firm, based on the premise that a signal must be costly to be credible.  Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) contend that open-market repurchase programs do not convey costly signals to 
the market because these programs do not signify firm commitments on the part of the 
management to follow through and actually repurchase the shares.  It is costless to announce a 
repurchase program and not to carry it out later.   Thus managers who intend to credibly signal 
their private information may choose a tender offer over an open market program.  Open market 
repurchase programs are simply authorizations, not firm commitments, which allow managers to 
repurchase shares at their sole discretion.   
The results reported in Table 6 are consistent with this argument.  The results clearly 
show that announcement period abnormal returns are much larger for tender offers than for open 
market repurchases.  The three-day CAR is 2.17% for negotiated repurchases, 2.62% for open 
market repurchases, 2.81% for open market/negotiated repurchases, 4.85% for fixed-price tender 
offers, and 7.43% for Dutch-auction tender offers.  However, our findings differ from the results 
of earlier studies in a couple of different ways.  First, the announcement-period average 
abnormal returns are much smaller than what have been reported in earlier studies.
8
  This may 
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simply be another manifestation of our earlier finding of much weaker wealth effects in the 
2000s than in the 1990s.   
Also, we find that Dutch-auction tender offers outperform fixed-price tender offers 
during the announcement period.  The difference of the three-day CAR is significant at the 0.02 
level.  The significant difference holds even after other deal characteristics such as size, stated 
purposes, and financing methods are controlled as reported later in Table 9. 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
There are two conflicting hypotheses about the relative wealth effects of fixed-price 
tender offers and Dutch-auction tender offers.  One hypothesis is that a fixed-price tender offer 
provides a more powerful and credible signal of undervaluation than a comparable Dutch-auction 
offer because a fixed-price offer specifies a single purchase price in advance, whereas a Dutch-
auction guarantees a relatively low (minimum) offer price.  Since the purchase price in a Dutch-
auction offer is determined by the tendering shareholders, it is less informative (about private 
managerial signals) than the price specified in a fixed-price offer (see Ramsay and Lamba, 2000).  
The implication is that fixed-price tender offers should produce larger wealth effects than Dutch-
auction offers.   
However, we find that Dutch-auction tender offers have a higher completion rate than 
fixed-price offers in the SDC Platinum database.  Only 7 of the 258 announced Dutch-auction 
tender offers in our sample are either terminated, expired, or suspended.  The number of 
terminated, expired, or suspended fixed-price offers is 22 out of a total of 222 announced 
programs.  The probability of non-completion of fixed-price tender offers is more than three 
times that for Dutch-auction offers.  The higher probability of under-subscription for fixed-price 
offers can lead to the weaker market reaction to the announcement.
9
  The results in Table 6 
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contradict the commonly-held view that fixed-price offers exhibit larger announcement-period 
wealth effects than Dutch-auction offers because fixed-price offers convey more credible signals 
of undervaluation.   
We also find that the firms that specify “Enhance Shareholder Value” as the purpose for 
repurchasing shares tend to choose tender offers over open market repurchase.  This leads us to 
believe that firms do not announce tender offer repurchase programs to signal undervaluation.    
Privately negotiated offers experience the smallest positive CAR (2.05%) during the 
three-day announcement period.  Past studies of the wealth effect of privately negotiated 
repurchases offer mixed results.  Dann and DeAngelo (1983), Bradley and Wakeman (1983), and 
Klein and Rosenfeld (1988) report that private repurchases are associated with significantly 
negative announcement returns.  On the other hand, Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) report 
significantly positive announcement-period return of 1.81%, which is close to our estimate of 
2.05%.   
Table 6 also shows that pre-announcement (-30, -1) returns are negative only for the open 
market and the open market/negotiated repurchase programs.  The pre-announcement CARs are 
2.23% for fixed-price tender offers, 1.40% for Dutch auctions, 0.98% for negotiated repurchases, 
-5.75% for open market repurchases, and -6.72% for open market/negotiated repurchases.  
Negative pre-announcement returns and positive announcement-period returns are usually 
interpreted as evidence that firms use repurchases to signal share-price undervaluation.  Our 
results are consistent with the idea that firms that significantly underperform during the pre-
announcement period announce open market repurchases to signal undervaluation.  However, the 




3.3. Stated Purpose of Repurchase Programs 
We next categorize the repurchase programs in our sample according to the various stated 
purposes of the programs and examine the CARs (see Table 7).  Not surprisingly, the largest 
announcement-period (0, +2) positive CAR is observed for the “Undervalued” group (4.80%).  
This group also experiences the largest negative pre-announcement CAR of -11.58%.  This may 
indicate that the stated purposes are credible and the market reacts accordingly.  The evidence 
also suggests that managers possess at least some ability to detect undervaluation and to time the 
market.  Managerial surveys generally support this view of market timing ability.  Graham and 
Harvey (2001) report that two-thirds of the CFOs surveyed acknowledge that they issue equity to 
take advantage of mispricing.  In another widely cited survey of high-level executives, Brav et al. 
(2005) report that over 80% of firms initiate stock repurchase programs when their stock is 
judged to be good value relative to other investments.  
The “Enhance Shareholder Value” group earns the next highest announcement-period 
CAR of 2.94%.  The SDC Platinum dataset does not provide a clear explanation of enhancing 
shareholder value.   We interpret this as augmenting value for the shareholders by various means, 
such as by distributing excess cash, adjusting debt ratios toward the optimal capital structure, 
reducing agency costs of free cash-flow, etc.  The significantly positive CAR indicates 
credibility of the stated purpose of the programs. 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
The lowest announcement-period CARs are earned by repurchase programs specifying 
“Offset Dilution Effect” and “Employee Benefits Plans” as purposes (1.37% and 1.78% 
respectively).  Executive stock option plans more than tripled during the late 1990s and are 
probably related to the growth in repurchase programs during the same period (see Table 1).  
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Firms sometimes repurchase shares to fund the exercise of executive and employee stock options.  
Executives may have a strong incentive to repurchase shares to preserve the value of their stock 
options.  Since dividend payments decrease the value of stock options, managers choose 
repurchases over dividends to distribute excess cash flows to shareholders (Lambert, Lanen, and 
Larcker, 1989).   
 
3.4. Sources of Financing 
We next examine the different financing methods that are used to repurchase shares and 
the associated CARs.  The results (reported in Table 8) show that the announcement period 
returns for debt-financed repurchases and cash repurchases are virtually identical.  When a stock 
repurchase program is financed with a debt issue, the firm‟s capital structure can change 
significantly.  However, the results show that debt-financed programs and cash-financed 
programs have similar announcement-period CARS.  The programs that are financed with a 
combination of cash and debt have the highest average CAR of 3.00%.  At the other extreme, 
stock-financed programs earn the lowest CAR of 1.45%.  The difference in the CARs between 
the debt- or cash-financed programs, and the stock-financed programs are significant.  Although 
the sample size for the stock-financed group is relatively small, the results are consistent with the 
idea that the markets generally do not favor equity issuances.  Perhaps the negative wealth effect 
of the equity issuance partially negates the positive wealth effect of the repurchase 
announcements in this sub-sample. 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
3.5. Multivariate Analysis  
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To investigate the wealth effect of firm size, program size, announcement year, pre-
announcement stock returns, repurchase methods, and financing methods while other factors are 
held constant, a cross-section ordinary least-square regression is estimated.  The dependent 
variable is the three-day (t = 0 to +2) cumulative abnormal return.  The independent variables 
include (1) the percentage of shares authorized at the initial authorization date (the number of 
shares authorized divided by the total number of shares outstanding); (2) the pre-announcement 
abnormal returns over the window (-120, -1); (3) log market value of equity of the repurchasing 
firm; (4) a dummy variable equal to1 if a repurchase program was announced after 2002, and 0 if 
otherwise; (5)-(7) three classification variables for the repurchase methods, Dutch-auction tender 
offer, fixed-price tender offer, and open market repurchase; (8)-(11) five classification variables 
for the stated purposes of repurchase, “Undervalued,” “Enhance Shareholder Value,” “Offset 
Dilution Effect,” “Employee Benefits Plan,” and “Employee Stock Option.”  The matrix of the 
two classification variables is constructed by using the SAS GLMMOD procedure.  The cross-
sectional regressions are estimated for the total sample period (1994-2007), and separately for 
two subsample periods: 1994-2002, and 2003-2007.   The results are reported in Table 9.  The 
overall results of the regression analysis reinforce the earlier analysis.   
The coefficient of the program size variable is significantly positive in all the regressions.   
The market reacts more favorably to larger programs, which confirms McNally‟s (1999) earlier 
finding that the market reaction depends on the size of the announced programs.  A repurchase 
program may have to be of a minimum size in order to send a credible signal to the market, 
which can trigger a revaluation of the stock‟s price by the market.   
Earlier we presented drastically declined announcement returns in the recent time period 
(in Table 5).  The dummy variable in this regression, which distinguishes repurchase programs 
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announced after 2002, is highly significant.  This confirms the weakened wealth effects in the 
2000s, while controlling for other deal characteristics that may affect the announcement returns. 
The pre-announcement CARs are significantly negatively related to the announcement-
period CARs in the total sample, and in the 1994-2002 subsample.   This is consistent with the 
implications of the signaling hypothesis.  If repurchase announcements signal undervalued prices 
of shares then the announcement-period bounce should be negatively correlated with pre-
announcement returns.  However, we do not find the same result in our second subsample (2003-
2007).   The pre-announcement CARs are positively (but insignificantly) correlated with the 
market reaction at the announcement in this sample.  The results indicate lack of support for the 
signaling hypothesis in the modern time period. 
(Insert Table 9 about here) 
We also find that the market values of the repurchasing firms‟ equity are negatively 
related to the announcement-period CARs.  This is consistent with the view that since smaller 
firms have greater information asymmetries, such firms are more likely to be undervalued than 
bigger firms.  Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) argue that small firms use repurchases to signal 
undervaluation, whereas big firms have other motivations for repurchasing stock.  Small firms 
that are undervalued are likely to buy back shares to take advantage of mispriced shares. 
Among the three classification variables of repurchase methods, the coefficient of the 
Dutch-auction variable is highly significantly positive in all three regressions whereas the 
coefficient of the open market variable is significantly negative.  These results confirm our early 
finding that Dutch-auction tender offers (open market repurchases) experience the largest 
(smallest) wealth effect.  
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Finally, among the five variables that classify stated purposes, the “Undervalued” 
variable is positively significant in the total sample only, while none of other variables is 
significant in any of the samples. These results support our earlier argument that the managers 
possess some ability to detect undervaluation and to the time the market.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
The finance literature has empirically examined several different motivations for stock 
repurchases using data from the 1980s and the 1990s.  However, the results of several recent 
surveys indicate that management‟s reasons for repurchasing shares may have changed during 
the past decade.  In this paper we reexamine the wealth effect of stock repurchase 
announcements in order to understand the true motivations for stock repurchases.   
We collect data for 11,862 repurchase programs that were announced between 1994 and 
2007 from the SDC Platinum dataset.  Our sample consists of open market repurchases (54.45% 
of the sample), combination of open market and negotiated (or private) repurchases (37.19% of 
the sample), negotiated repurchases (4.30% of sample), Dutch-auction tender offers (2.19%), and 
fixed-price tender offers (1.88% of the sample).   
We find that significant decline in stock prices commence from about 120 days before the 
announcement date.  The decline in stock price seems to accelerate as the announcement date 
approaches.  The average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the window (-120, -1) is -
11.84%.  Incidentally, the pre-announcement decline in stock price is observed for open market 
and open market/negotiated repurchases only.  We do not find significantly negative pre-
announcement abnormal returns for other types of repurchases.   
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Our results show that significantly positive stock price reaction begins from the 
announcement day and lasts for three days.  The average CAR over the window (0, +2) is 2.72%.  
However, when we examine the average announcement period CAR by year, we find that the 
CAR has declined from over 3% before 2003 to under 2% after 2003.  We also provide evidence 
that the announcement period CARs were significantly negatively correlated with 
preannouncement CARs only for the repurchase programs that were announced before 2003. 
When we examine the stated purposes of the repurchase programs, we find that the number of 
programs listing “Undervalued” (shares) has decreased significantly since 2003.   Overall, we do 
not find much support for the signaling hypothesis in the post-2002 data.  This is consistent with 
the findings of recent industry surveys by Baker, Powell, and Veit (2003) and Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely (2005). 
We also find that Dutch-auction tender offers experience larger announcement period 
positive returns than fixed-price tender offers.  This contradicts some of the results in the extant 
literature.  Our results suggest that firms choose open market repurchases to signal undervalued 
shares.  By comparison, tender offers are not chosen to signal undervaluation, but to enhance 
shareholder values by other means.  Open market announcements provide the repurchasing firms 
with enormous flexibility, which may result in superior market timing ability.  Managerial 
market timing ability is somewhat supported by our results.  When we examine the stated 
purposes of the repurchase announcements, we find that most programs that specify 
“Undervalued” (shares) as the primary purpose are open market repurchases.  Also, programs 
specifying “Undervalued” (shares) as the reason for repurchasing shares experience the highest 
negative pre-announcement average CAR and the highest positive announcement period CAR.  
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These results are consistent with managerial ability to opportunistically time the announcement 








The table reports the number of repurchasing programs (N) announced each year during 1994 – 
2007.  Also reported are each program‟s percentage of shares authorized at the initial 
authorization date (PSAIAD), which is calculated by dividing the total number of shares 
authorized to repurchase by the total number of shares outstanding at the initial authorization 
date, the total dollar value authorized at the initial authorization date (VIAD), the total dollar 
value authorized from the beginning date to the ending date of a repurchase program (TVA), the 
total number of shares authorized from the beginning to the end of a repurchase program (TSA), 
the total value spent to complete the repurchase program (TVR), and the market value of the 
repurchasing firm‟s equity at the initial authorization date (MVE).  All the statistics reported are 

















1994 762 5.00 10.5 16.7 1.00 9.4 245 
1995 740 5.00 10.0 15.2 1.00 10.1 194 
1996 922 5.11 11.6 17.4 1.00 9.0 226 
1997 877 5.29 17.3 22.5 1.29 15.1 298 
1998 1,396 5.59 12.8 19.5 1.38 10.9 275 
1999 1,163 5.57 12.6 17.4 1.50 10.0 254 
2000 1,005 6.17 12.8 16.3 1.50 8.1 245 
2001 863 5.00 10.2 11.4 1.09 6.7 174 
2002 704 5.28 14.1 16.4 1.50 13.7 289 
2003 545 5.20 26.0 30.0 1.83 25.0 407 
2004 629 5.01 50.0 62.2 2.80 55.1 1,017 
2005 728 5.39 60.0 78.1 3.24 70.7 1,213 
2006 702 5.57 63.0 77.6 2.75 67.6 1,110 






Different Features of the Repurchase Programs in the Sample 
 
Panel A: Repurchase Method 
The SDC Platinum database reports eight different repurchase methods.  This table includes five 
main methods.  The numbers of observations for the other three methods are small.  The table 
shows the number of repurchase programs announced during 1994 to 2007, the percentage of the 
total sample, the percentage of shares authorized at initial authorization date (PSAIAD), the total 
value authorized at initial authorization date (VIAD), the total value authorized (TVA), and the 
market value of the repurchasing firm‟s equity at the initial authorization date (MVE).  All the 
reported numbers are the median values for the sample.   









Open Market 6,427 54.45 5.00  18.8  23.3    373 
Open Market/Negotiated 4,389 37.19 5.35  20.0  25.9    447 
Negotiated 507 4.30  7.84  16.1  16.5   209 
Dutch Auction 258 2.19 13.63 56.7  57.0 380 
Fixed-Price 222 1.88 15.00  19.3  21.5   152 
 
 
Panel B: Stated Purpose of Repurchase  
Among the 11,862 repurchase programs in our sample, 3,337 repurchase programs disclose 
specific purposes.   For these 3,337 cases, the SDC Platinum dataset reports a total of 11 
different purposes.  This table reports statistics for 5 commonly specified purposes and “General 
Corp Purpose.”  A small number of programs list other purposes – we exclude those from the 
Table.  In cases where multiple purposes are listed for a repurchasing program, we assume that 
the first listed purpose is the primary purpose.    









General Corp Purpose 8,393 71.55 5.30  20.1  25.0 408   
Enhance Shareholder Value 1,646 14.03  5.74  19.5  25.0   360 
Undervalued 613 5.23  5.72   7.3  10.0   140 
Stock Option Plan 504 4.30  5.00  16.9  26.9   403 
Employee Benefits Plans  336 2.86 5.00  16.8  27.4   401 





Panel C: Sources of Funding 
For the firms that disclose the sources of funding, our database identifies 17 different sources.  A 
careful examination reveals that most repurchase programs are funded from two or three 
different sources.  Based on our subjective judgment, we classify the programs by four major 
funding sources: cash, debt, cash/debt, and stock. 









Undisclosed 9,431 77.01 5.14  17.9  21.5   355 
Cash 1,933 15.78  5.65  25.0  34.0   489 
Debt 588 4.80  6.98  30.0  42.0   506 
Cash/Debt 259 2.11 7.55  32.8  50.0   574 






Daily Average Abnormal Returns 
 
We calculate daily abnormal returns from t = -10 to t = +10 using the market model.  For the 
parametric test, the Patell test Z-values and p-values are reported.  For the non-parametric test, 
the ratios of positive to negative returns and the Corrado Rank Test Z-values and p-values are 
reported. 
Day N AR 
Positive: 
Negative Z-value p-value 
Rank 
Test Z p-value 
-10 11,859 -0.23% 0.45:0.55 -9.495 <.0001 -2.11 0.0358 
-9 11,859 -0.22% 0.45:0.55 -8.811 <.0001 -2.16 0.0312 
-8 11,859 -0.24% 0.44:0.56 -9.496 <.0001 -2.43 0.0157 
-7 11,858 -0.16% 0.46:0.54 -7.659 <.0001 -1.70 0.0894 
-6 11,857 -0.27% 0.45:0.55 -10.035 <.0001 -2.49 0.0132 
-5 11,857 -0.31% 0.45:0.55 -12.658 <.0001 -2.92 0.0038 
-4 11,857 -0.20% 0.45:0.55 -8.732 <.0001 -1.89 0.0602 
-3 11,856 -0.31% 0.45:0.55 -12.265 <.0001 -2.69 0.0076 
-2 11,856 -0.28% 0.46:0.54 -10.000 <.0001 -1.73 0.0842 
-1 11,854 -0.25% 0.47:0.53 -8.398 <.0001 -1.12 0.2620 
0 11,858 1.69% 0.63:0.37 64.792 <.0001 12.04 <.0001 
1 11,856 0.85% 0.56:0.44 35.704 <.0001 6.89 <.0001 
2 11,857 0.18% 0.50:0.50 7.191 <.0001 1.72 0.0864 
3 11,856 0.10% 0.48:0.52 3.169 0.0015 0.24 0.8101 
4 11,856 0.02% 0.48:0.52 1.128 0.2595 0.10 0.9197 
5 11,849 0.06% 0.48:0.52 2.355 0.0185 0.46 0.6466 
6 11,844 0.06% 0.47:0.53 2.702 0.0069 0.44 0.6589 
7 11,839 0.08% 0.49:0.51 2.580 0.0099  0.49 0.6279 
8 11,838 -0.03% 0.47:0.53  0.062 0.9505 -0.12 0.9055 
9 11,832 0.01% 0.48:0.52 0.891 0.3732 0.01 0.9927 






Pre and Post Announcement Returns 
 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model. The table reports cumulative 
abnormal returns for various event windows.  For the parametric test, the Patell test Z-values and 
p-values are reported.  For the non-parametric test, the ratios of positive returns to negative 
returns, and the Corrado Rank Test Z-values and p-values are reported. 
 
Panel A: Pre-Announcement Returns 
Days N CAR 
Positive: 
Negative Z-value p-value Rank Test Z p-value 
(-180,-151) 11,594 -0.22% 0.45:0.55 -2.394 0.0167 -0.355 0.7231 
(-150,-121) 11,721 -0.51% 0.46:0.54 -2.745 0.0060 -0.267 0.7898 
(-120,-91) 11,779 -1.09% 0.44:0.56 -7.250 <.0001 -1.861 0.0634 
(-90,-61) 11,842 -1.60% 0.42:0.58 -12.896 <.0001 -3.530 0.0005 
(-60,-31) 11,862 -3.29% 0.39:0.61 -23.891 <.0001 -6.642 <.0001 
(-30,-1) 11,861 -5.86% 0.37:0.63 -39.226 <.0001 -10.539 <.0001 
 
Panel B: Post-Announcement Returns 
Days N CAR 
Positive: 
Negative Z-value p-value Rank Test Z p-value 
(+4,+30) 11,858 0.23% 0.48:0.52 -2.945 0.0032 0.492 0.9260 
(+31,+60) 11,720 -0.29% 0.47:0.53 -5.954 <.0001 -0.895 0.2283 
(+61,+90) 11,602 -0.52% 0.46:0.54 -7.140 <.0001 -1.782 0.0400 
(+91,+120) 11,467 -0.44% 0.46:0.54 -6.732 <.0001 -1.629 0.0405 
(+121,+150) 11,269 -0.57% 0.46:0.54 -6.491 <.0001 -1.377 0.1691 






Average Cumulative Abnormal Announcement Returns by Year 
 
Abnormal returns are computed using the market model.  The table reports cumulative abnormal 
returns over the window (0, +2).   The open market repurchase subsample includes open market 
repurchases and combinations of open market repurchase and negotiated repurchase.  The tender 
offer repurchase subsample includes Dutch-auction tender offers and fixed-price tender offers.  
 
 
Total Sample  Open Market Repurchase  Tender Offer Repurchase 
Year N  CAR  N CAR  N CAR 
1994 762 2.91%  671 2.59%  24 6.40% 
1995 740 2.50%  661 2.33%  14 12.98% 
1996 922 3.01%  839 2.96%  28 5.88% 
1997 877 2.48%  770 2.19%  30 8.43% 
1998 1,396 3.69%  1,329 3.55%  31 7.12% 
1999 1,163 3.46%  1,066 3.26%  42 8.66% 
2000 1,005 4.22%  935 4.05%  48 6.93% 
2001 863 3.47%  806 3.26%  35 7.80% 
2002 704 4.15%  649 4.02%  26 11.60% 
2003 545 1.59%  489 1.36%  39 3.26% 
2004 629 1.48%  574 1.35%  36 4.05% 
2005 728 1.24%  654 1.04%  43 2.96% 
2006 702 1.31%  630 1.22%  47 2.65% 






Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Different Methods of Repurchase 
 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model.  These are summed over various 
windows to compute the cumulative abnormal returns.  For the parametric test, the Patell test Z-
values and p-values are reported.  For the non-parametric test, the ratio of positive returns to 
negative returns, and the Corrado rank test Z-values and p-values are reported. 
Days N Mean CAR 
Positive: 
Negative Z-value p-value 
Rank 
Test Z p-value 
Dutch Auction 
      (-30,-1) 258 1.40% 0.53:0.47 2.043 0.0410 -0.043 0.6580 
(0,+2) 258 7.43% 0.85:0.15 31.578 <.0001 8.454 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 258  1.26% 0.51:0.49  1.145 0.2524 1.492 0.1366 
        Fixed Price Tender Offer 
     (-30,-1) 222 2.23% 0.50:0.50 1.660 0.0969 0.209 0.8347 
(0,+2) 222 4.85% 0.64:0.36 14.691 <.0001 3.803 0.0002 
(+3,+30) 222 -0.69% 0.46:0.54 -0.204 0.8387 1.477 0.1408 
        Negotiated 
      (-30,-1) 507 0.98% 0.49:0.51  1.236 0.2167 -0.243 0.8085 
(0,+2) 507 2.17% 0.59:0.41  9.888 <.0001 5.315 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 505 1.27% 0.47:0.53  0.519 0.6036 0.026 0.9791 
        Open Market 
      (-30,-1) 6,427 -5.75% 0.35:0.65 -29.791 <.0001 -9.282 <.0001 
(0,+2) 6,427 2.62% 0.66:0.34 43.135 <.0001 11.361 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 6,427 0.89% 0.48:0.52  3.197 0.0014 -0.963 0.3366 
        Open Market/Negotiated 
     (-30,-1) 4,389 -6.72% 0.35:0.65 -27.980 <.0001  -9.616 <.0001 
(0,+2) 4,388 2.81% 0.66:0.34 36.194 <.0001 10.724 <.0001 







Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Different Stated Purposes of the Programs 
 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model.  These are summed over various 
windows to compute the cumulative abnormal returns.  For the parametric test, the Patell test Z-
values and p-values are reported.  For the non-parametric test, the ratio of positive returns to 





Negative Z-value p-value 
Rank    
Test Z p-value 
Undervalued 
      (-30,-1) 613 -11.58% 0.29:0.71 -15.836 <.0001 -6.812 <.0001 
(0,+2) 613 4.80% 0.73:0.27 18.863 <.0001 9.283 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 613 1.06% 0.51:0.49 0.322 0.7474 1.166 0.2446 
        Stock Option  Plan 
     (-30,-1) 504 -5.97% 0.35:0.65 -7.89 <.0001 -4.203 <.0001 
(0,+2) 504 2.15% 0.64:0.36 10.443 <.0001 5.891 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 504 1.17% 0.49:0.51 1.399 0.1618 1.127 0.2604 
        Offset Dilution Effect 
     (-30,-1) 238 -4.29% 0.38:0.62 -4.094 <.0001 -4.274 <.0001 
(0,+2) 238 1.37% 0.61:0.39 3.312 0.0009 2.912 0.0038 
(+3,+30) 238 0.27% 0.50:0.50 -0.004 0.9967 -1.270 0.2052 
        Enhance Shareholder Value 
     (-30,-1) 1,646 -4.62% 0.39:0.61 -12.553 <.0001 -5.319 <.0001 
(0,+2) 1,646 2.94% 0.68:0.32 25.030 <.0001 10.614 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 1,646 -0.09% 0.49:0.51 -1.551 0.1209 0.624 0.5333 
        Employee Benefits Plans 
     (-30,-1) 336 -3.76% 0.40:0.60 -4.559 <.0001 -2.832 0.0049 
(0,+2) 336 1.78% 0.63:0.38 6.517 <.0001 5.496 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 336 0.04% 0.52:0.48 -0.602 0.5475 0.601 0.5482 
        General Corporate Purpose 
     (-30,-1) 8,393 -5.52% 0.37:0.63 -33.488 <.0001 -7.683 <.0001 
(0,+2) 8,392 2.63% 0.66:0.34 49.903 <.0001 12.241 <.0001 







Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for Different Financing Methods 
 
Daily abnormal returns are calculated using the market model.  These are summed over various 
windows to compute the cumulative abnormal returns.  For the parametric test, the Patell test Z-
values and p-values are reported.  For the non-parametric test, the ratio of positive return to 
negative returns, and the Corrado rank test Z-values and p-values are reported. 
Days N Mean CAR 
Positive: 
Negative Z-value p-value 
Rank 
Test Z p-value 
Debt 
       (-30,-1) 588 -4.01% 0.39:0.61 -7.169 <.0001 -3.436 0.0007 
(0,+2) 588 2.71% 0.69:0.31 15.598 <.0001 8.559 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 588 -0.78% 0.45:0.55 -1.666 0.0957 0.441 0.6594 
        Cash Reserves 
      (-30,-1) 1,933 -6.16% 0.36:0.64 -17.013 <.0001 -5.803 <.0001 
(0,+2) 1,933 2.84% 0.68:0.32 26.333 <.0001 10.631 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 1,933 0.25% 0.48:0.52 -1.189 0.2346 1.089 0.2769 
        Cash Reserves/Debt 
     (-30,-1) 259 -7.84% 0.31:0.69 -9.008 <.0001 -4.918 <.0001 
(0,+2) 259 3.00% 0.16:0.84 9.783 <.0001 5.524 <.0001 
(+3,+30) 259 -0.65% 0.44:0.56 -1.821 0.0687 -0.649 0.5168 
        Stock Offering 
      (-30,-1) 36 -5.31% 0.31:0.69 -1.690 0.0910 -0.829 0.4079 
(0,+2) 36 1.45% 0.67:0.33 2.788 0.0053 1.243 0.2148 






Cross-sectional Regression Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the three-day (t = 0 to +2) cumulative abnormal return at the 
announcement of a repurchase program.   The independent variables include (1) authorized 
shares divided by total number of shares outstanding prior to the announcement year (PSAIAD); 
(2) cumulative abnormal return from -120 to -1 (Pre-CAR); (3) log market value of equity of the 
repurchasing firm (MVE); (4) a dummy variable that is 1 if the announcement year is after 2002 
or 0 otherwise (Year); (5)-(7) three classification variables for the repurchase methods, which 
include Dutch-auction tender offer (DA), fixed-price tender offer (FPOL), and open market 
repurchase (OP); (8)-(11) five classification variables for the stated purposes of repurchase, 
which include Undervalued (UVL), Enhance Shareholder Value (ESV), Offset Dilution Effect 
(DIL), Employee Benefits Plan (EBP), and Employee Stock Option (STP).  The design matrix of 
the two classification variables is constructed by using the SAS GLMMOD procedure.  t-values 





2003 – 2007 
Sample 
1994 – 2002 
Sample 
Intercept  0.05893 (18.50)
*
  0.02628 (6.17)
*















PSAIAD   0.00126 (9.67)
*
  0.00119 (6.29)
* 





   
Method-DA  0.03830 (6.75)
*
  0.02950 (4.70)
*
  0.04454 (5.41)
*
 
Method -FPOL  0.00406 (0.61) -0.00019 (-0.03)  0.01252 (1.22) 







Purpose-UVL  0.00777 (1.99)
**
  0.01136 (1.40)  0.00679 (1.46) 
Purpose -ESV -0.00187 (-0.76) -0.00472 (-1.57)  0.00052 (0.16) 
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2
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Significant at less than 1% 
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 For example, Business Wire reported on August 28, 2006 that “Amazon.com, Inc. (the 
"Company") announced today that its Board of Directors authorized the Company to repurchase 
up to $500 million of the Company's common stock within the next 24 months, through one or 
more open market transactions, privately negotiated transactions, transactions structured through 
investment banking institutions or a combination of the foregoing. The Company may do so if it 
believes its shares are undervalued.” 
3
 Business Wire, December18, 2006.   
4
 Business Wire, June 16, 2006.   
5
 We are puzzled about why firms sometimes issue shares to repurchase shares.  As an example 
of this, American Oriental Bioengineering announced on June 9, 2008 a stock repurchase 
program of up to $75 million, and simultaneously disclosed plans to issue $125 million in 
convertible preferred stock in a private offering.  
6
 All our conclusions remain the same when we use the Fama-French three-factor model instead 
of the market model. 
7
 We also provide cross-sectional regression evidence later (in Table 9) that announcement-
period CARs are significantly negatively correlated with pre-announcement CARs before 2003. 
The correlation is positive and statistically insignificant between 2003 and 2007.  A significantly 
negative regression coefficient suggests that repurchase announcements signal undervalued share 
prices.  The regression evidence presented in Table 9 strengthens our argument that recent 
repurchase announcements by relatively bigger firms are made for reasons that may not have 
much to do with signaling undervalued shares. 
8
 Previous studies report abnormal returns of 3-5% for open market repurchases and 8-15% for 
fixed-price and Dutch-auction tender offers. 
9
 Dutch-auction tender offers are also less expensive for the repurchasing firms because the 
purchase (winning) price in a Dutch-auction is likely to be lower than the purchase price of a 
fixed-price offer.   
